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Background: Over the last decade, global air traffic has nearly doubled and with the growth of 
international travel and trade, comes the potential for the global transmission of infectious 
disease. This requires countries to have the capacity to respond to pandemic threats and for clear 
guidance on conducting risk assessments in an efficient and timely manner due to the dynamic 
nature of air travel. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed disjointed risk assessment and 
containment measures across the globe underscoring the need for harmonious evidence-based 
protocols and guidance in order to respond to emerging viruses and potential pandemics more 
efficiently and effectively.  
Objective: The conduction of this quasi-systematic review aims to examine and address changes 
in the international public health and aircraft guidance for infectious disease containment 
measures related to air travel amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic. It intends to examine the 
changes in the methods, models, frameworks, and best practices since the 2009 European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) RAGIDA project (Risk Assessment and Guidance 
for Infectious Disease transmitted on Aircraft) that have shaped current responses to novel 
COVID-19.  
Methods: Using PubMed and EMBASE databases, both primary and secondary analyses were 
explored to gather evidence of possible transmission and contact tracing of Tuberculosis (TB), 
Influenza, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS) via airplane travel. Additionally, technical reports and guidance on risk assessment and 
management of infectious disease threats pertaining to air travel from the World Health 
Organization (WHO), International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) were collated through a 
general search, noting modifications between 2009 and current guidance.  
Results: Existing international public health and aviation guidance for risk assessment and 
containment measures vary by organization and disease. Guidelines issued are largely 
recommendations only and therefore are not legally binding or enforceable. The available body 
of research is limited in quantity and quality of studies and vary by case definitions and 
thoroughness of contact tracing efforts. Furthermore, risk assessments and decisions to conduct 
contact tracing are performed on a case-by-case basis.  
Conclusions: While the disease-specific studies available were overall biased and of minimal 
power, this is not to be considered a research gap from a public health perspective. Transmission 
is more likely in points of entry or exit or in communities. Resources are better allocated to 
research for preventive, diagnostic, and treatment measures such as vaccines, more sensitive and 
specific testing, and safer and more effective treatments. However, further research into the 
effectiveness of screening passengers at points of exit and entry as recommended by current 
guidance for COVID-19 may strengthen the body of literature for respiratory disease 
transmission associated with air travel. As the world endures unprecedented and uncertain times, 
the findings in this review may inform decision-making in the interim as countries begin to re-





With the growth of international travel and trade, comes the potential for the global 
transmission of infectious disease. This requires countries to have the capacity to respond to 
pandemic threats and for clear guidance on conducting risk assessments in an efficient and 
timely manner due to the dynamic nature of air travel. In 2007, the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control launched the RAGIDA project (Risk Assessment and Guidance for 
Infectious Disease transmitted on Aircraft). It aimed to assist Member States in the evaluation of 
risk for transmission of various infectious agents on aircrafts as well as to assist the national 
public health authorities in determining guidelines around contact tracing and containment 
measures. It contained two parts: a systematic review and a collection of disease-specific 
guidance for tuberculosis, influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), invasive 
meningococcal disease, measles, rubella, diphtheria, Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers, 
Lassa fever, smallpox and anthrax. Both the systematic review and disease-specific guidance 
included guidelines on risk assessment and case management from international and national 
public health agencies as well as international aviation organizations. 
 Since the publication of the RAGIDA project in 2009, global air traffic has nearly 
doubled in the number of passengers travelling each year due to the affordability and availability 
of air travel. Recent reports also reveal a nearly 50% increase in passenger departures (Table 1) 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2018). With the growing ubiquity of air travel comes 
a heightened awareness of the speed and ease infectious diseases are able to spread across the 
globe. Several studies have shown that air travel is associated with the intercontinental spread of 
new emerging viruses by both importation of cases and in-flight transmission. Airplanes were 
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NUMBER OF PASSENGER AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES 26.1million 37.8million 
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS 2.25billion 4.3 billion 
Table 1. Air traffic statistics in 2009 and 2018.  
 
The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic highlighted the need for harmonious guidance for public health management of 
infectious diseases associated with air travel. Coordination of an appropriate public health 
response includes early recognition of disease, risk assessment, and execution of appropriate 
containment measures. However, it is difficult to implement this protocol without potentially 
inciting unnecessary panic and interrupting air traffic. The RAGIDA project was initiated largely 
in response to this call for action. Since 2009 until current day, there have been six global major 
infectious disease threats indicating a need for updated international guidance.  
 
Figure1. Timeline of Major Infectious Disease Threats over the last decade  
 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic response highlighted disjointed and varied efforts at every 
level from the World Health Organization, national governments, and by state. Countries have 
approached the COVID-19 response with varying levels of urgency and severity, resulting in a 
patchwork of flight bans, business closures, and stay-at-home orders. These events underscore 
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the need for coordinated evidence-based protocols and guidance in order to respond to emerging 
viruses and potential pandemics more efficiently and effectively. 
Current guidelines according to the United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 
European Centers for Disease Control (ECDC), International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), and World Health Organization (WHO) will be explored in this study. These findings 
will be compared to the RAGIDA 2009 guidance to evaluate how the project shaped current 




PUBMED/Medline and EMBASE databases were searched using the following search terms: 
1. (respiratory disease) AND (airline transmission OR airplane transmission) 
2. (contact tracing) AND (airplanes) 
 
Exclusion criteria  
The author used the following exclusion criteria to determine article eligibility: 
1. Title or abstract did not explicitly mention “airplanes”, “aircraft”, or “air travel”; 
2. Disease-specific studies did not pertain to influenza, tuberculosis, SARS, MERS, or 
COVID-19; 
3. Studies that did not pertain to human transmission 
Electronic searches were restricted between January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2020 (present). For 
disease-specific studies, only papers focused on influenza, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, 
Tuberculosis, and SARS-CoV2 were included. No language restrictions needed to be applied. 
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Titles and abstracts were filtered by the author. Only studies that evaluated human exposure on 
aircraft were retained. Repeat papers were removed.  
 
The author screened the titles obtained from the initial search and excluded articles that 
did not meet the selection criteria and further excluded articles that did not directly relate to risk 
assessment, containment measures, or public health guidance after reading the full text of the 
remaining articles.  
Additionally, technical reports and guidance on risk assessment and management of 
infectious disease threats pertaining to air travel from the World Health Organization (WHO), 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) were collated through a general search, 
noting modifications between 2009 and current guidance. 
  




# PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLES 
AND GREY LITERATURE 
3700 109 
DISEASES Tuberculosis, influenza, severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), invasive 
meningococcal disease, measles, rubella, 
diphtheria, Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic 
fevers, Lassa fever, smallpox, and anthrax 
Tuberculosis, influenza, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), middle eastern 




ECDC, WHO, ICAO, IATA, ACI, US CDC, 
Health Canada, Health Protection Agency 
(UK), Robert Institute (Germany) 
ECDC, WHO, US CDC, ICAO, 
IATA 
YEARS -2009 2009-2019 
Table 2. Content comparison between RAGIDA project and this review. 
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Results 
286 articles were identified through PUBMED/Medline and 6 from EMBASE using the 
two search parameters. Findings were restricted to publication after 2009 in order to assess new 
findings and changes in guidance and practices after publication of the RAGIDA project, 
excluding 111 studies. Studies pertaining to animal transmission were omitted, excluding 22 
records. Disease specific studies for diseases not included in this review (influenza, tuberculosis, 
SARS, MERS, COVID-19) resulted in 46 exclusions. 25 duplicates removed. 14 were further 
excluded after reading the full text, leaving 74 remaining articles to be included in this review. 
Factors that influence risk assessment of infectious disease transmission on board aircrafts and 




Figure 2. PRISMA flow diagram for identification of records for this review. 
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Existing Guidance 
The need for preparation to respond to public health events has been underlined by the 
SARS outbreaks of 2003, H1N1 pandemic of 2009, as well as the subsequent MERS, H7N9, 
Ebola, and Zika outbreaks in the last decade. The experience and knowledge gained during these 
global health emergencies gave rise to the development of best practices by both public health 
and aviation organizations. The World Health Assembly revised the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) of 1969 in 2005 and changes came into force in 2007. The purpose of the IHR 
(2005) are: 
“to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to 
public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic 
and trade.” It outlines seven key regulations including:  (1) a scope not limited to any 
specific disease or manner of transmission, but covering “illness or medical condition, 
irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to 
humans”; (2) State Party obligations to develop certain minimum core public health 
capacities; (3) obligations on States Parties to notify WHO of events that may constitute a 
public health emergency of international concern according to defined criteria; (4) 
provisions authorizing WHO to take into consideration unofficial reports of public health 
events and to obtain verification from States Parties concerning such events; (5) 
procedures for the determination by the Director-General of a “public health emergency 
of international concern” and issuance of corresponding temporary recommendations, 
after taking into account the views of an Emergency Committee; (6) protection of the 
human rights of persons and travellers; and (7) the establishment of National IHR Focal 
Points and WHO IHR Contact Points for urgent communications between States Parties 
and WHO” (WHO, 2005).  
 
The PHEIC notification system was the key innovation of this document. It mandated in 
Article 6 that each State Party utilize the decision tool in the IHR Annex 2 following a risk 
assessment to determine if an event constitutes a PHEIC and to notify the WHO within 24 hours 
of the events, the public health response implemented, commit ongoing information sharing, and 
public health measure coordination (Appendix A). Pertaining to aircraft specifically, flight crew 
are to notify the destination airport of cases indicative of a disease of infectious nature or 
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evidence of public health risk. Airlines may deny boarding to passengers suspected of being 
infected with a communicable disease. IHR mandated Member States to develop country-
specific, national risk assessment capacity as an integral function of the prevention, surveillance 
and response system as either an independent team or within an existing structure (WHO, 2005).  
 In the aviation sector, the Convention on International Civil Aviation legally requires 
countries to prevent the spread of communicable disease in cooperation with other agencies. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) developed the Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPs) to manage aviation safety risks in 2001. The SARPs take a proactive safety 
strategy based on the implementation of the State Safety Programme (SSP) that addresses safety 
risks in combination with the safety management systems (SMS) by the service providers. The 
last modifications to this document were made in 2013, but portions regarding infectious disease 
control fall within Annex 9, updated in 2008, that include public health guidance as well as 
procedures regulating advance passenger information (API) systems (ICAO, n.d).  
Annex 9 Chapter 8E: Implementation of international health regulations and related 
provisions 8.15 states “the pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall ensure that a suspected 
communicable disease is reported promptly to air traffic control, in order to facilitate provision 
for the presence of any special medical personnel and equipment necessary for the management 
of public health risks on arrival” in compliance with IHR (2005) Article 28.6. Completion of a 
“General Declaration Card” may be advised to notify air traffic control (Appendix B). It 
continues to list a “communicable disease could be suspected and require further evaluation if a 
person has a fever of over 100 degrees Fahrenheit that is associated with symptoms as appearing 
obviously unwell, persistent cough, impaired breathing, persistent diarrhoea, persistent vomiting, 
skin rash, bruising or bleeding without previous injury, or confusion of recent onset” (ICAO, 
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2017). Pilots are obliged to legal requirements and procedures of departure or destination 
countries. Recommended practice for when a public health threat has been identified and 
passenger information is requested for the purposes of contact tracing, the state requesting 
information should accept the IATA “Public Health Passenger Locator Card” (Appendix C). 
Chapter 8F: Communicable disease outbreak national aviation plan outlines that a Contracting 
State shall establish a national aviation plan in preparation for an outbreak of a communicable 
disease posing a public health risk or public health emergency of international concern. In 
January 2018, IATA produced the Emergency Response Plane and Action Checklist for air 
carriers to use in the event of a public health emergency. It recommended all air carriers have or 
create emergency response plans in case of a public health emergency. The majority of air 
carriers already have plans, but many do not. ICAO and IATA offer frameworks to help develop 
preparedness plans for countries. 
In 2015, the WHO updated the Handbook for the Management of Public Health Events in 
Air Transport to include information on Ebola Virus Disease and Middle East Respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus. However, it was intended only to be a guide for the development of 
national or site-specific standard operating procedures. The document noted the need for 
coordination and clear lines of communication between the disparate priorities of public health 
and aviation sectors. It recommended the formation of a new committee between airport 
operators, civil aviation authority, aircraft operators, and public health sector to coordinate 
preparedness plans (WHO, 2015), however one does not currently exist. It also reiterates that 
travel restrictions are likely to only have a limited effect of minimizing the spread of disease and 
is not effective particularly once community transmission has begun. WHO favors screening of 
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departing passengers rather than arriving passengers because it is easier to contain a disease prior 
to travel outside the outbreak area (WHO, 2015). 
In the same year, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
noted that air-related contact investigations are implemented either to identify contacts of a 
traveler who was potentially contagious during flight, to notify, educate, and evaluate travelers 
about their potential exposure in a timely manner, and to provide post-exposure prophylaxis or 
treatment (Rogers, 2015). SARS, Tuberculosis, and novel influenza virus or other emerging 
infectious diseases all fall under the “quarantinable” disease category (Rogers, 2015) (Appendix 
D). The criteria to determine whether to initiate contact investigation are confirmed illness based 
on infectiousness and severity, length of time between report of illness and flight, and duration of 
flight based on research on infectiousness of the illness over time. Recommendations vary 
between countries and international organizations. 
 
 




There has been growing concern over the spread of infectious disease during air travel via 
airborne (<5 µm) or droplet (>5 µm) transmission. Droplets can travel only short distances; 
however, air particles remain suspended in the air and therefore may spread further distances. 
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Studies show risk of infection is highest for passengers seated within two-rows or approximately 
3 feet (Bagshaw & Illig, 2019). The concern is that air recirculating in the cabin increases risk 
for the dissemination of disease through the air. However, both ICAO and WHO state that the 
overall risk of contracting a disease from an infected person on an airplane is the same as any 
confined space (WHO, n.d) (Weiss et. al., 2019). 
The HEPA (high efficiency particulate air filters) used in modern airplanes are the same 
utilized in hospitals and are effective at capturing greater than 99.97 percent of both liquid and 
solid airborne microbes including both bacteria and viruses (International Air Transport 
Association, 2018). Air quality is held to high standards providing total change of air 20-30 
times per hour that recycles up to 50% of cabin air recirculated through the HEPA filters. Highly 
contagious disease such as influenza are more likely to infect other passengers when the 
ventilation system is not operating before the engines are started. This is most likely the case 
when the aircraft is on the ground waiting for departure if the auxiliary power source is not on. In 
those instances, disembarkation may be advised. WHO recommends passengers should not be 




The “2-row rule” has been widely accepted as the standard transmission zone for 
respiratory illnesses on airplanes. The WHO, CDC, ECDC, and other public health and aviation 
safety bodies follow this 2-row guideline (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). 
This is based on estimations from studies on the transmission of tuberculosis focusing on flights 
of duration of 8 hours or more. However, variation from more studies, particularly SARS, have 
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shown evidence of a passenger up to 7 rows away being infected and of shorter duration. There 
is a 6% increase in risk to passengers seated within 2 rows of an infected individual and 2% risk 
to passengers seated beyond 2 rows (Hertzberg & Weiss, 2017).  
 
Passenger Information 
According to ICAO, passenger related information can be divided into two categories: 
Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). Guidelines for both 
API and PNR are developed with World Customs Organization (WCO) and IATA, with the most 
recent updates in 2014 and 2013, respectively. API is collected at check-in and includes 
biographic information and flight details by the carrier prior to departure and is shared with the 
border control agencies in the country of destination for immigration, customs, and security 
purposes (ICAO, 2013).  
PNR is generated at time of booking for an airplane ticket and can vary greatly between 
airlines. It typically includes the booking code, date of reservation, dates of travel, passenger 
name, frequent-flyer information, contact information, payment methods, travel itinerary, travel 
agency or agent, code share and split PNR information, travel status, baggage information, 
ticketing information, seat information including seat number, and historical changes to any item 
listed. PNR can be useful for customs, law enforcement, security, and to assist risk assessment. 
Only data available in the operating airline carriers’ systems is passed along to other airports 
because different carriers have their data shared and stored based on separate operational 
agreements. Additionally, countries may classify “private” information differently, therefore 
creating discrepancies in the passenger information collected and saved (ICAO, 2010).  
 14 
In a 2018 information paper, ICAO noted future changes to Annex 9 indicating that PNR 
data can be requested by nations through a new “Single Window” concept as long as it is 
retained for no longer than reasonably necessary. This would be in the case of requests for 
information for contact tracing purposes. However, the paper warned of the cost to airlines to 




The transmission of tuberculosis during air travel is the most extensively studied. There 
have been no cases of active TB transmission during air travel reported, however there is 
evidence that transmission from highly infectious cases on flights over 8 hours has occurred 
(WHO, 2008).  
The original 2009 RAGIDA risk assessment guidelines for disease transmitted on aircraft 
contained a literature review, suggested approach, criteria to consider, and template questions 
and answers to conduct TB contact tracing (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 
2009). However, another systematic literature review and subsequent independent risk 
assessment guideline specifically for Tuberculosis were published in 2014 (European Centre for 
Disease Control, 2014b). The 2014 review revealed that risk of TB transmission during air travel 
is very low. It estimates a risk of 0.1-1.4% of contacts potentially contracting infection from a 
sputum-smear-positive case during flights over 8 hours (Kotila, et. al., 2014). Publication bias is 
likely to have occurred, favouring studies where flight-related infections have been detected and 
therefore the published data represent a small proportion of actual exposure and risk on aircraft. 
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This is because many countries do not conduct flight-related TB screening and of those that do, 
many do not share results. 
A 2010 review of tuberculosis investigations associated with air travel launched by the 
CDC between 2007 and 2008, noted no cases of TB disease among passenger contacts were 
reported and that positive TB results were significantly associated with risk factors for prior TB 
infection (odds ratio (OR)=23; p<0.001) (Marienau et. al., 2010). 
WHO recommends assessing risk of transmission from both infectious (culture and 
sputum-positive) and potentially infectious (culture-positive and sputum-negative) patients. The 
WHO Handbook for the Management of Public Health Events in Air Transport (2015) determine 
close contacts on aircraft as a starting point for contact investigation and define it as a passenger 
who was seated in the same row, two rows in front, or two rows behind a person with infectious 
or potentially infectious TB for 8 hours or longer and therefore is considered to be at risk of 
infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis (WHO, 2015). 
In 2008, the CDC guidelines stated contact tracing was recommended if a case was 
sputum-spear-positive. In 2012, there was a revision stating that contact investigations should 
only be conducted if the index case is both smear and cavitation positive. Another change 
between 2008 and 2012 was the reduction of the maximum time between the flight and 
notification of infection from 6 to 3 months in agreement with the WHO guidelines. The CDC 
also recommends that CT should be conducted for any suspected cases of MDR-TB even if the 
patient is smear-negative (ECDC, 2014b). 
 In contrast to the harmonized guidelines of the CDC and WHO, the ECDC via the 
RAGIDA project recommends CT to be initiated only if there is already evidence of transmission 
from the smear-positive index case to close contacts beyond the confines of the flight. ECDC 
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also only considers index cases as “positive by microscopy in spontaneously produced or 
induced sputum or bronchiolar lavage” (ECDC, 2014b). Additionally, the ECDC consider 
limiting contact investigation up to two seats away from the index case for wider aircraft. Special 
efforts for CT should be conducted if infants, children, or immunocompromised individuals such 
as HIV-positive or diabetic people are identified as contacts. An algorithm for contact tracing 
can be found in the Appendix (Appendix E). 
 The three public health bodies agree on the CT guidelines for TB in the WHO 2008 
Tuberculosis and Air Travel: Guidelines for Prevention and Control-Third Edition (WHO, 2008) 
that indicates CT for passengers in the same row as the index case as well as two rows in front 
and two behind due to the highest risk of contracting infection to be in the rows closest to the 
case, that time elapsed between diagnosis and flight should be limited to 3 months, and that flight 
duration should be 8 hours or more including time on the ground. There is also consensus that all 
culture-positive or sputum-positive pulmonary TB who have not received treatment, should not 
travel by air. 
 
Influenza 
 The RAGIDA-Influenza systematic review was published in 2014 and described 15 
studies of influenza and subsequent contact tracing after the identification of an index case. 7 
articles described multiple events. The time delay for contact tracing initiation ranged from 1 to 
47 days and successfully traced contacts ranged from 4% to 100%. Flight duration ranged from 
45 minutes to 20 hours and 20 minutes and one study reported a ground delay with malfunction 
of the ventilation system that led to an attack rate (AR) of 72% (Leitmeyer & Adlhoch, 2016). 
The studies used different case definitions as well as definitions for index and secondary cases 
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and described events for different influenza strains including pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm2009, B/Beijing/184/93-like, human parainfluenza 1, A/Taiwan/1/86 (H1N1), 
A/Alaska/18/77 (H3N2), and influenza-like illness (ILI) with an unknown causative agent 
(ECDC, 2014a). Some studies indicated secondary cases on flights with index cases further than 
within a 2-row radius around the index patient (Shankar et. al, 2014). On the other hand, one 
study estimated that passengers seated within 2 rows of the index case were at a 3.6% increased 
risk of contracting H1N1 while those within 2 seat proximity to the case faced a 7.7% increased 
risk (Foxwell et. al, 2011). The differing case and contact definitions resulted in biases including 
misclassification due to case definition based only on clinical symptoms, quality of sampling, 
selection and ascertainment bias, and recall bias because many were retrospective studies. 
Furthermore, alternative exposure of infection could not be ruled out before, during, or after the 
flight and antiviral prophylaxis after flight may have influenced outcomes. 
 Due to the strain variation and severity by strain, RAGIDA/ECDC recommendations for 
contract tracing vary between seasonal influenza, novel influenza with pandemic potential or 
seasonal influenza with increased virulence, and influenza virus with zoonotic potential. Contact 
tracing of seasonal influenza is not recommended due to the high probability of transmission 
during influenza season in all enclosed environments. For novel influenza with pandemic 
potential or seasonal influenza with increased virulence, contact tracing should not be conducted 
as default procedure, but on a case-by-case basis based on case classification of index case, time 
of travel and relation to onset of symptoms, epidemiological situation in country of departure or 
destination, and purpose of contact tracing. An algorithm for contact tracing can be found in the 
Appendix (Appendix F,G). If a passenger on flight develops symptoms related to respiratory 
infection, the passenger should be isolated and provided a surgical face mask. The flight crew 
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should follow IATA guidelines for infection control and notify public health authorities at the 
destination airport as per ICAO PANS-ATM procedures and follow health authority policies of 
the country of destination regarding passenger location cards (Appendix B) (ICAO, 2017). 
 In 2009 during the influenza A H1N1 “swine flu” pandemic, the CDC issued the Interim 
Guidance for airline flight crew and persons meeting passengers arriving from areas with avian 
influenza recommending any passengers or crew with ILI not to travel. In flight, passengers who 
developed symptoms were to be isolated as much as possible, to be given a face mask, and for 
the aircraft to continue functioning of the ventilation system until all other passengers and crew 
have disembarked. Gloves were recommended for crew, but no routine use of face masks or N95 
respirators (CDC, 2009). Furthermore, quarantine officials at American destination airports 
would determine medical transportation and surveillance measures.  
The current World Health Organization (WHO) guidance dates back to 2009 with the 
WHO technical advice for case management of Influenza A(H1N1) in air transport after the 
H1N1 epidemic. It recommends contact tracing of passengers seated within two rows of a case of 
A(H1N1) influenza 2016 (WHO, 2009) and similar passenger isolation measures in-flight as the 
CDC with extension to any accompanying travellers. All travellers seated in the same row, two 
rows in front, and two rows behind the ill traveller are to be asked to complete a passenger 
locator card (Appendix B). This collection of information may be extended to other passengers 
on the plane as determined by the national pandemic preparedness plan of the destination airport.  
 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
The RAGIDA risk assessment on SARS literature review was conducted prior to 2009 
and no new guidance was found after. The RAGIDA literature review yielded 9 events of SARS 
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transmission during air travel with subsequent contact tracing in 7 peer-reviewed articles all in 
2003, the year of the SARS epidemic. Flight duration ranges from 2 to 13 hours. No information 
on HEPA filters or ground delays were described. Cases were reported from Canada, France, the 
USA, and Germany. Contact tracing was initiated between 3 and 90 days after the date of travel 
and contact tracing of all passengers was conducted for 5 of the 9 events. Methods of contact 
tracing included passenger locator cards (2), flight manifests (5), telephone contacting (4) and 
questionnaires (4) (ECDC, 2009). 
 26 passengers were infected during flight across all studies with evidence for 
transmission being high in 24 of these cases. Seat locations of infected contacts was available for 
two of the events and ranged between within the same row and seven rows away. While 
symptoms were reported during the flight for 2 events, no evidence for on-board transmission 
was found or was inconclusive. Of 3436 identified contacts, 2915 were traced successfully and 
0.8% of identifiable fellow passengers of SARS index cases were infected (ECDC, 2009). 
As of 2004, the WHO declared risk of transmission of SARS in aircraft to be very low 
and that HEPA filters combined with air circulation minimizes the spread of all microbes in the 
cabin (WHO, 2004). However, WHO advises vigilance in monitoring symptoms of SARS 
including high fever, cough, shortness of breath, and difficulty breathing. Research shows that a 
person infected with SARS is only infectious when they are symptomatic (Goubar et. al, 2009). 
Therefore, in-flight, WHO recommends only for passengers that are symptomatic that they wear 
a protective face mask, be isolated from other passengers, and be given a designated toilet as to 
reduce interaction with other passengers. Designated crew caring for a symptomatic person 
should wear a protective face mask, gloves, and eye protection. WHO recommends passengers or 
crew that develop symptoms delay their travel until fully recovered, for contacts of passengers or 
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crew to not travel for 10 days and recommend exit screening measures of temperature checks. 
Pilots of aircraft must notify the destination airport and passenger disembarkation may be 
delayed in order for a medical officer to examine the patient. Depending on the assessment by 
the medical office and public health authorities, all passengers and crew may be required to 
provide their contact information for the next 14 days (ECDC, 2009).  
 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 
Two systematic reviews were identified through the search parameters and databases for 
MERS from the RAGIDA project. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) 
was discovered in 2012. Between the discovery and January 2020, 2521 cases have been 
reported of which 919 were deaths yielding a crude case fatality of 36%. During the development 
of this guidance, the novel SARS-CoV2 was identified and the RAGIDA researchers propose the 
same recommendations for contact tracing can be applied to the novel coronavirus until more 
information is known (ECDC, 2020). 
The review by Al-Tawfiq et. al. reported there has been no confirmed in-flight transmission 
of MERS-CoV, however the research for in-flight transmission of SARS is limited. One study 
with a symptomatic SARS patient yielded an attack rate of 13.4% (16 of 119 passengers). The 
attack rate was higher for persons closer in physical proximity to the index case: 8 of 23 persons 
seated three rows in front of the patient and 10 of the 88 seated elsewhere (Olsen et. al., 2003). 
Other flights carried more symptomatic passengers with fewer secondary cases. Furthermore, the 
annual Hajj attracts pilgrims from all over the world and yet the 2012 Hajj season reported no 
MERS cases among the estimated four million pilgrims. The Saudi Ministry of Health 
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recommended the elderly, immune-compromised, pregnant women, children, and those with pre-
existing conditions to postpone the Hajj (Al-Tawfiq et.al., 2014). 
The RAGIDA review yielded 47 records screened for description of a case of MERS-CoV 
confirmed with laboratory testing, travelling by air during the symptomatic phase of the disease. 
HEPA filter function was not described in any of the identified records. 29 of 47 records stated 
that contact tracing had been carried out of which 18 described results. Contact tracing 
investigations were aimed at passengers either within a distance of 2 seats around the case, 2 or 3 
rows around the case, or included all passengers and crew members. Time delay of contact 
tracing ranged from 1 to 28 days with proportion of contacts ranging from 35% to 100% and 
proportion followed-up after 14 days ranged from 15% to 100%. No secondary cases were 
reported among any traced passengers (ECDC, 2020). 
The decision to conduct contact tracing must be on a case-by-case basis based on symptom 
severity during the flight and timing of potential contact tracing. Contact tracing should be 
initiated upon confirmation of a MERS-CoV case as defined by the World Health Organization: 
“a person with a laboratory confirmation of MERS-CoV infection irrespective of clinical signs 
and symptoms” (WHO, 2018). Contact tracing for probable cases, defined by WHO as: 
“(1) A febrile acute respiratory illness with clinical, radiological, or histopathological 
evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease (e.g. pneumonia or Acute Respiratory Distress 
Syndrome) and Direct epidemiologic link (2) with a laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV case 
and testing for MERS-CoV is unavailable, negative on a single inadequate specimen or 
inconclusive; (2) A febrile acute respiratory illness with clinical, radiological, or 
histopathological evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease (e.g. pneumonia or Acute 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome) that cannot be explained fully by any other etiology and the 
person resides or travelled in the Middle East, or in countries where MERS-CoV is known to 
be circulating in dromedary camels or where human infections have recently occurred and 
testing for MERS-CoV is inconclusive; (3) An acute febrile respiratory illness of any severity 




should be considered only depending on the epidemiological situation and available resources. 
Transmission is through droplets, aerosols, and direct contact. There is clear but infrequent and 
intermittent human-to-human transmission (Al-Tawfiq et. al, 2014). The mean incubation period 
for MERS-CoV is approximately 5-6 days with a range up to 14 days (Arabi et. al, 2017). 
Therefore, contact tracing can be initiated up to 14 days after the flight. Identified contacts 
should be informed about the event, symptoms, when to consult a doctor, as well as advised to 
restrict contact with others. If contact tracing is initiated after 14 days of the flight, contacts may 
be contacted once to ask if symptoms developed. If more than 28 days have passed since the 
flight, no contact tracing should be conducted. If contact tracing is initiated, focus should be on 
passengers seated two seats in all directions around index case, crew members serving the area 
where index case was seated, and persons who had contact with the index case. If a crew 
member is an index case, all other crew members and all passengers seated in the area served by 
the case should be considered contacts. A MERS contact tracing flowchart is available in the 
Appendix (Appendix H) (ECDC, 2020).  
 
COVID-19 
In March 2020, the World Health Organization released several interim guidance 
documents for COVID-19 and two specifically for case management in aviation settings: 
Management of ill travellers at points of entry for COVID-19 (WHO, 2020b), and Operational 
considerations for managing COVID-19 cases or outbreak in aviation (WHO, 2020c). 
 A confirmed case is defined as “a person with laboratory confirmation of COVID-19 
infection, irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms”. A suspect case is defined as:  
“(1) a patient with acute respiratory illness (fever and at least one sign/symptom of 
respiratory disease, e.g., cough, shortness of breath) and a history of travel to or residence 
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in a location reporting community transmission of COVID-19 disease during the 14 days 
prior to symptom onset; (2) a patient with any acute respiratory illness and having been in 
contact with a confirmed or probable COVID-19 case (see definition of contact) in the 
last 14 days prior to symptom onset; or (3) a patient with severe acute respiratory illness 
(fever and at least one sign/symptom of respiratory disease, e.g., cough, shortness of 
breath; AND requiring hospitalization) and in the absence of an alternative diagnosis that 
fully explains the clinical presentation”.  
 
A probable case is defined as “(1) a suspect case for whom testing for COVID-19 virus is 
inconclusive or (2) a suspect case for whom testing could not be performed for any reason 
(WHO, 2020a). 
 In flight, recommendations are the same as reported in previous guidance including 
isolating the passenger, provision of surgical mask, as well as designating one crew member to 
serve the ill person. The typical IHR and Annex 9 reporting to destination airport of ill passenger 
are outlined as well as the Passenger Locator Cards for contacts 2 rows away (Appendix I). The 
main difference in this guidance is that contacts of ill passenger are to be kept under public 
health observation upon landing to inform all of the risks and measures to prevent transmission. 
If the laboratory result of a suspected case is positive following a flight, all contacts are 
recommended to be quarantined at home or isolated depending on national policy. If laboratory 
result is negative, all other passengers may still be advised to self-monitor for symptoms and 
self-isolate if symptoms arise (WHO, 2020c). 
In addition to the usual IHR guidelines and ICAO Annex 9, the interim guidance 
provides advice on detection of ill travelers at international points of entry, interviewing of all 
passengers, reporting alerts of ill travellers with suspected COVID-19, and isolation and initial 
case management of suspected cases. Ill travellers can be detected through self-reporting, visual 
observation, or temperature measurement at point of entry (WHO, 2020b). 
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The WHO continues to advise against travel or trade restrictions to countries as evidence 
shows restricting the movement of people and goods is in most cases ineffective and may disrupt 
aid, business, and may have negative socioeconomic impacts. However, interferences with 
international traffic may only be justified in the beginning of an outbreak for countries to gain 
time to implement preparedness measures based on risk assessment, proportionate to public 
health risk, short, and be reconsidered regularly. Travel bans are also not effective and several 
countries that denied entry of travellers or suspended flight traffic with China and other affected 
countries, have reported cases. Temperature screening is not an effective way to stop 
international spread due to incubation periods or may not be symptomatic. The World Health 
Organization recommends providing prevention recommendations to travellers, and to collect 
health declarations at arrival with travellers’ contact information for proper risk assessment and 
contact tracing. Returning travellers are instructed to self-monitor for 14 days and follow the 
national protocols of the country of arrival (WHO, 2020b). 
For travelers with fever that has persisted more than 48 hours or fever and persistent 
cough, difficulty breathing, or appears obviously unwell to be reported to CDC. Crew are to 
identify sick travelers and minimize contact between the other passengers and cabin crew, offer a 
facemask, and treat all bodily fluids as infectious (CDC, 2020). The CDC notes that laboratory-




The existing literature in peer-reviewed journals remains limited for most diseases, 
except tuberculosis and influenza. The low quantity and quality of disease-specific studies 
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conducted have been observational and provide insufficient data to conduct meta-analyses which 
would offer a quantifiable estimate for the risk of disease transmission by contagion. Similarly, 
to Browne et. al., (2015), a limited body of evidence was found on coronavirus transmission on 
aircraft. 
Many epidemiological studies have reporting bias due to incomplete flight manifests 
from only monitoring direct-flights and only collecting complete information for passengers that 
book directly through the airline as opposed to third-party websites due to PNR regulations 
(Johansson et. al, 2011). Each of the literature reviews analyzed in this work contained several 
biases including recall bias, selection bias, and publication bias and suffered from small sample 
sizes. Furthermore, differing case definitions and thoroughness of contact tracing may have 
resulted in missed cases as well as over-estimation of transmission risk. Other factors that may 
influence outcomes include that some studies relied on clinical presentation of symptoms, 
potential high incidence of other respiratory disease that present similarly, time lag of decision 
for action, and difficulties in obtaining passenger contact details in a timely manner. 
Other study limitations include that many studies focus on the “two-row rule” to assess 
risk of transmission which may lead to missed incidences of transmission or other index cases. 
As in the study by Shankar et. al., 2014, there were cases discovered up to 7 rows away. Another 
study by Gupta et. al, 2011 found that droplets from a single cough from an index case could 
disperse uniformly to a seven row diameter within 4 minutes, with simulated functioning 
ventilation and air circulation systems. Furthermore, most studies fail to account for passenger 
movement or crew member movement within the air cabin for the duration of the flight which 
may increase infection risk in the cabin (Han et. al., 2014). Additionally, studies often only track 
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transmission in-flight, but do not account for importation of cases or asymptomatic transmission 
and therefore grossly underestimate the effects of air travel on spreading disease. 
While many international and national public health and aviation bodies have issued 
guidance to mitigate the spread of communicable disease during air travel, the guidelines remain 
recommendations and risk assessment is still relatively subjective. Much of the guidance from 
these entities are shaped by tuberculosis and influenza studies. However, different viral diseases 
have differing levels of infectiousness, incubations periods, symptoms, and susceptibility of 
other passengers. There are also ethical considerations regarding if treatment is available and if 
contact tracing can be conducted in an effective manner in time for notified contacts to seek 
treatment. Therefore, not only do recommended protocols differ between diseases, but each 
individual case must be considered independently of other incidences due to a variety of factors 
including environment, duration of flight, departure or destination from countries with known 
cases or high transmission of the disease of interest. 
It is evident that epidemics and emerging diseases influence the guidance issued by 
public health entities. In the 21st century this was seen most with SARS in 2003 and H1N1 in 
2009. These two events shaped the majority of current day WHO, ICAO, ECDC, and CDC 
guidance on risk assessment and containment measures of infectious disease transmission on 
aircraft. Epidemic-specific interim guidance was issued by WHO and CDC for outbreaks for 
Ebola and H7N9, however those acted more as alerts rather than changes in the official guidance.  
An important fact to note is that most guidance by the WHO, CDC, ECDC, and ICAO are not 
legally binding except for the IHR in terms of notifying destination countries if there is a 
symptomatic passenger on board. WHO and ICAO mandate all countries to have a plans for risk 
assessment and surveillance, but the frameworks provided are only suggestions, are 
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unenforceable, and the country plans vary. Even the guidance that exists during a global 
pandemic are to be implemented based on country “priorities and capacities” and comprise of 
recommendations rather than guidance. Much of the guidelines regarding follow-up measures, 
prioritization, quarantine measures, and passenger data sharing are all country-specific and 
therefore containing a global pandemic proves to be difficult (Grout et. al., 2017). 
 In-flight recommendations for passengers exhibiting symptoms is relatively universal 
across WHO, ICAO, CDC, and ECDC. It includes isolation of the individual as far away as 
possible from other passengers, provision of a facemask, use of one restroom if possible, and a 
dedicated crew member. The crew member is to wear a mask, gloves, and protective eyewear as 
available. The use of HEPA filters in all modern airplanes in combination with ventilation 
systems is assured by WHO to minimize the spread of all microbes in the cabin. However, all 
mentions of HEPA filters highlight its widespread use specifically on large, modern, commercial 
airplanes with no mention regarding older or smaller planes, or private aircraft. 
In terms of contact tracing, several limitations and factors affect the decision to conduct 
contact tracing as well as the effectiveness of doing so. Identification of contacts proves to be 
difficult because of the unavailability of complete passenger data due to airline carrier limitations 
to recording certain information through ICAO and IATA regulation on PNR as well as being 
limited to data for passengers who book directly through the airline. Passenger Locator Cards 
have been developed by both ICAO and WHO, but these are only useful if the index case is 
identified during the flight. Because case definitions require positive-test results to initiate 
contact investigations, the index case must be symptomatic on the flight in order for crew 
members to know to collect the information of nearby passengers. These cards are also not 
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always available in flight and collecting this data upon landing may not capture information of 
all contacts.  
Recommendations by WHO, CDC, and ICAO all indicate that if public health officers 
suspect disease transmission on an airplane and decide to conduct CT, they should prioritize 
passengers seated within 2 rows of the index case, however, ideally all passengers aboard aircraft 
are contacted for follow-up. ECDC was the only entity that recommended limiting to two seats 
away from index case in larger aircraft in the RAGIDA-TB guidelines. Another change in the 
guidelines for TB was the change of the CDC’s revision of 6 months between flight and patient 
diagnosis to 3 months to match those of WHO and ECDC. This argument for the more restricted 
protocol was that it inflicted minimal risk to public health while halving the costs and therefore is 
more beneficial from epidemiological and economic lenses (Coleman et. al, 2014). 
Retrospective collection of passenger data also proves to be difficult because of the 
incurred operational and financial costs to airlines to transfer passenger data. Contact tracing 
may not be advisable if there is already community transmission of the virus or in later stage of a 
pandemic in which post-exposure prophylaxis can no longer be provided. A study by Cauchemez 
et. al., 2009 indicate that when the population incidence reaches 0.1% of the population, non-
pharmacological interventions are advised. When non-pharmacological interventions such school 
closures or ban of mass gatherings are put in place, it is advisable to also stop contact tracing 
(Fraser et. al., 2009). However, this is not listed in any international or national guidance. 
Moreover, in diseases with short incubation periods like influenza, it is difficult to justify contact 






From the results of the literature review and examination of aviation and public health 
guidance, the risk of transmission of tuberculosis, influenza, SARS, and MERS on aircraft 
appear to be very low if not the same as within any confined space for an extended period of 
time. While the disease-specific studies available were overall biased and of minimal power, this 
is not to be considered a research gap from a public health perspective. Transmission is more 
likely in points of entry or exit or in communities. Resources are better allocated to research for 
preventive, diagnostic, and treatment measures such as vaccines, more sensitive and specific 
testing, and safer and more effective treatments.  
The RAGIDA project is often referenced in guidance by ICAO, IATA, WHO, and the US 
CDC. With limited empirical studies evaluating risk of transmission on aircrafts and the lack of 
specific international guidance, the RAGIDA publications provide evidence-based 
recommendations for disease-specific contact tracing and risk assessment. Current WHO and 
CDC guidance for COVID-19 align with previously published guidance and protocols. However, 
if the varying national responses to COVID-19 yield any conclusions, it is that there is a need for 
more coherent and enforceable guidelines for all nations to follow as well as the dissemination of 
global guidance that travel bans ultimately do not limit the global spread of viral respiratory 
diseases. 
Further research into the effectiveness of screening passengers at points of exit and entry 
as recommended by current guidance for COVID-19 may strengthen the body of literature for 
respiratory disease transmission associated with air travel. As the world endures unprecedented 
and uncertain times, the findings in this review may inform decision-making in the interim as 
countries begin to re-open borders and more is learned about COVID-19. 
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• Infectious tuberculosis (TB) 
• Novel influenza virus or other emerging infectious disease 
• Smallpox 
• SARS 
• Pneumonic Plague 
• Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHF) includes Crimean-Congo 
hemorrhagic fevers, Ebola/Marburg, Lassa fever/Lujo 











Appendix E. RAGIDA Algorithm for contact tracing of TB cases symptomatic on aircraft (RAGIDA-TB). 
 
 
Annex F. RAGIDA Algorithm for contact tracing for novel influenza virus in humans with pandemic potential or a 





Appendix G. RAGIDA Algorithm for contact tracing for human infection with influenza virus with zoonotic 













Appendix I. Passenger Locator Card from WHO IHR. 
 
 
 
